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Abstract 
This paper uses data on very small UK geographies to investigate the effective size of local labour 
markets. Our approach treats geographic space as continuous, as opposed to a collection of non-
overlapping administrative units, thus avoiding problems of mismeasurement of local labour markets 
encountered in previous work. We develop a theory of job search across space that allows us to 
estimate a matching process with a very large number of areas. Estimates of this model show that the 
cost of distance is relatively high - the utility of being offered a job decays at exponential rate around 
0.3 with distance (in km) to the job - so that labour markets are indeed quite ‘local’. Also, workers are 
discouraged from applying to jobs in areas where they expect relatively strong competition from other 
jobseekers.  The  estimated  model  replicates  fairly  accurately  actual  commuting  patterns  across 
neighbourhoods, although it tends to underpredict the proportion of individuals who live and work in 
the same ward. Finally, we find that, despite the fact that labour markets are relatively ‘local’, local 
development policies are fairly ineffective in raising the local unemployment outflow, because labour 
markets overlap, and the associated ripple effects in applications largely dilute the impact of local 
stimulus across space. 
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How local are labour markets? A number of important questions in labour economics turn on the
answer. In recent years there has been a resurgence of interest in the consequences of localization
of economic activity for workers’ welfare (see Moretti, 2011, for a recent overview) and in policies
aimed to improve labour market outcomes in disadvantaged areas (Glaeser and Gottlieb, 2008). In
the US, federal, state and local governments combined spend nearly $50 billion per year on local
development policies. Notable examples are the Moving to Opportunities program (Katz, Kling
and Liebman, 2001) and the Empowerment Zones program (Busso, Gregory and Kline, 2011).
These policies need to know about the size of local labour markets to decide about the appropriate
nature of the intervention. If labour markets are very local then an eﬀective intervention will have
to be targeted to the disadvantaged areas themselves even if those areas are not conducive to
generating employment. But if labour markets are not as local then there is less need for the
targeted intervention and a targeted intervention may simply attract workers from other more
advantaged areas. There is also a sizeable related literature on the incidence of local shocks to
labour demand and their impact on labour mobility and labour market equilibrium (see among others
Blanchard and Katz, 1992, Bound and Holzer, 2000, and Notowidigdo, 2011). Such research needs
ac l e a rd e ﬁnition of a ‘place’.1
Most academic research on the topic and government statistical agencies divides geographical
space into non-overlapping areas, which are then assumed to be single labour markets. Examples
would be the 367 Metropolitan Statistical Areas, the BEA’s 179 Economic Areas and the 720
Commuting zones for the US, or the 320 Travel to Work Areas (TTWAs) for the UK. Within labour
markets, spatial inequalities would be interpreted as the outcome of residential sorting. While these
eﬀorts are understandable and useful they do have their problems. For example, UK TTWAs are
constructed so that (as far as possible) at least 75% of the population resident in a TTWA actually
work in the area, and at least 75% of those who work in the area also live in the area. Because
people commute from large distances to central London to work, this means that the whole of the
Greater London area is classiﬁed as a single labour market. But those who live in the northern
suburbs of London do not really think of the far southern suburbs as part of ‘their’ local labour
market. And the non-overlapping nature of local labour markets constructed in this way causes
inevitable discontinuities around the boundaries. Someone living just inside the London TTWA
will be classiﬁed as living in an enormous labour market while someone living just across the border
1Another related issue is the spatial mismatch hypothesis (Kain, 1968), suggesting that the unemployment rate
of blacks in the inner city was so high because many jobs had moved to the suburbs and these jobs were no longer in
the local labour market of those living in the city (see also Hellerstein, Neumark and McInerney, 2008, and Boustan
and Margo, 2009, for recent studies).
2in the Luton TTWA will be classiﬁed as being in a modestly-sized local labour market. In reality,
these people are in essentially the same labour market.
The fundamental cause of these problems is a failure to recognize the continuous nature of
geographic space, that the labour market for one individual at one location will overlap with that
for another individual in a diﬀerent but not too distant location. Consequently, there is no way to
segment an economy into non-overlapping areas without mismeasuring local labour markets. But,
how can one model geographical space in a more realistic way while preserving tractability? One
of the contributions of this paper is to show how one might approach this problem.
The approach of this paper is to treat geographic space as continuous, as opposed to a collection
of non-overlapping administrative units. This avoid problems of mismeasurement of local labour
markets described above, and turns out to have crucial implications for the impact of local policies.
We model the size of local labour markets by the cost of distance, whether measured as geographic
distance, commuting time, or commuting cost. If the cost of distance is high then workers will be
more reluctant to consider jobs at more distant locations than if the cost of distance is small. This
approach means that the boundary of a local labour market is fuzzy but that is the right way to
think about a jobseeker’s decision problem.
Let us brieﬂy consider how one might approach the question of estimating how local are labour
markets from individual behavior. Commuting data might be expected to contain useful information
about the size of local labour markets as they tell us about how far workers seem prepared to travel
to jobs. But the cross-section of commuting patterns represents the outcome of a bunch of decisions
(e.g. residential location) that muddy the waters. To give a speciﬁc example, consider the academic
job market. From commuting patterns one would observe that most faculty live reasonably close to
their place of work and perhaps conclude that the labour market for academics was relatively local.
But, of course, it is better described, albeit with some hyperbole, as global. What information would
allow us to detect that? The argument of our paper is that one could detect that by looking at the
address of the job market candidate when they applied for a job and looking at the distances they
are considering. In the academic market a job candidate in a speciﬁc current residential location is
prepared to take a job over a very large geographical area but will then change residential location
to be close to whatever job they obtain. In this situation it makes sense to think of the individual
being in a very large local labour market as they will consider a very wide range of jobs. But they
will end up with a low commute, so commuting data would not reveal the true extent of the local
labour market.
Our research design is intended to try to avoid these potential problems and get closer to the
heart of the question of how local are labour markets. By a local labour market we mean the set of
jobs that an unemployed worker, currently in a particular location, will apply for. It may be that,
3if the application is successful, the individual chooses to change residential location but that would
not concern us. We use monthly data on unemployment and vacancies in small neighborhoods
in England and Wales (8,850 in total). The high-frequency nature of the data means that it is
reasonable to think that the location of the unemployed represents the location when currently
applying for jobs. The large number of neighborhoods means that our data provide a much closer
approximation to the continuous nature of geographic space than all existing studies.
The ideal data set would contain information on the location of jobs applied for by individual
workers. We do not have such information but we propose a model in which data on the ﬁlling of
vacancies can be used to infer the distance over which workers look for work. The intuition for our
approach is the following. Consider a vacancy in area A. It is plausible to think that the ease of
ﬁlling this vacancy depends on the number of unemployed workers for whom the vacancy is in their
local labour market (and the number of other vacancies, something our framework accounts for but
complicates the intuitive discussion here). If the ease of ﬁlling a vacancy in A is inﬂuenced by the
number of the unemployed in area B but not in area C, then it is a reasonable conclusion that area
A is in the local labour market for people who live in area B but not for those who live in area C.
The job search model that we propose provides an explicit micro-foundation for how to model
the linkages between a very large number of areas in a way that preserves tractability. Unemployed
workers decide whether to apply to job vacancies at diﬀerent locations based on the cost of distance
to target jobs and on the likelihood that applications to such jobs be successful, in turn depending on
how many other jobseekers across the economy would ﬁnd these jobs attractive. Inter-dependencies
across areas arise because the number of applicants to jobs in a given area is likely to be inﬂuenced
(even if only very slightly) by unemployment and vacancies in all other areas, insofar they are
ultimately linked through a series of overlapping markets. Key parameters of this framework are
the rate of decay of the utility obtained from a job with the distance from that job, and the way
in which job competition in a given area discourages jobseekers from applying to jobs in that area.
The resulting vector of job applications in each area is the central ingredient of the process by
which local vacancies are ﬁlled.
We estimate our model using data on unemployment and vacancies disaggregated at the Census
ward level. We use very small spatial units such as wards as building blocks for overlapping local
labour markets, and let job matching patterns at the local level guide us as to the eﬀective size of
local labour markets. Estimates of this model suggest that the cost of distance is relatively high.
Speciﬁcally, the attractiveness of a job falls by about 4.5 times if one pulls the job 5 km further
aﬁeld from a jobseeker’s location. Also, workers are discouraged from applying to jobs in areas
where they expect relatively strong competition from other jobseekers. An interesting side result is
that constant returns in search markets are not rejected, implying that larger-scale markets would
4not systematically oﬀer more eﬃcient matching of workers to jobs. The estimated model predicts
commuting patterns across UK wards that replicate fairly accurately actual commuting patterns
obtained from the 2001 Census, although it tends to underpredict the proportion of individuals
w h ol i v ea n dw o r ki nt h es a m ew a r d .F i n a l l y ,w eﬁnd that, despite the fact that labour markets are
relatively ‘local’, location-based policies in the form of local stimulus to labour demand or improved
transport links are rather ineﬀective in raising the local job ﬁnding rate, because labour markets
overlaps and the associated ripple eﬀects in applications largely dilute the eﬀect of local policies
across space.
The plan of the paper is as follows. In the next Section we describe the data we use and in
Section 3 we present some estimates of matching functions allowing for geographic spillovers that
are similar to existing models in the literature. However, we argue that such equations are limited
in what they can tell us about the size of local labour markets. In Section 4 we then present our
structural model of job search across space, whi c hi st h e ne s t i m a t e di nSection 5. Section 6 uses
structural estimates to illustrate the simulated impact of location-based policies on the spatial
distribution of the unemployment outﬂow. Section 7 ﬁnally concludes.
2 Data and descriptive statistics
We use data on unemployment and vacancies, disaggregated at the Census ward level (CAS 2003
classiﬁcation). These data are available on NOMIS (nomisweb.co.uk) and run monthly since April
2004. There are 10,072 wards in Great Britain, of which 7,969 in England, 881 in Wales, and 1,222
in Scotland, with an average population of 5,670. Although unemployment and vacancy data are
available for Scottish wards, commuting data, which we will also use below, are not, and thus we
restrict our sample to the 8,850 wards in England and Wales2.
Our data cover registered unemployment (the “claimant count”) and job vacancies advertised
at Jobcentres. The UK Jobcentre Plus system is a network of government funded employment
agencies, where each town or neighborhood within a city has at least one Jobcentre. A Jobcentre’s
services are free of charge to all users, both to jobseekers and to ﬁrms advertising vacancies. To
be entitled to receive welfare payments, unemployed beneﬁt claimants are required to register at a
Jobcentre, and ‘sign-on’ every two weeks.
Employers wishing to advertise job vacancies can submit a form with detailed job speciﬁcations
to a centralized service called Employer Direct. The job vacancy is then assigned to the employer’s
local Jobcentre, and will have a dedicated recruitment adviser, who can assist the employer with
the recruitment process. Regardless of the Jobcentre in charge, the Census ward for each vacancy is
2Because the border between England and Scotland is very sparsely populated, the commuting ﬂows across the
border are small so it is not a problem to regard Scotland as distinct from England.
5deﬁned using the full postcode of the job location. Each job vacancy is advertised in three ways: on
the centralized employment website www.direct.gov.uk; through the Jobcentre Plus phone service
for job applicants; and on the Jobcentre Plus network, which can be accessed at Jobcentre oﬃces
around the country. Jobseekers can sample job openings via one or more of these methods, using
various search criteria (sector, occupation, working hours, distance from a given postcode etc.).
The detailed geographic information on both claimant unemployment and job vacancies recorded
at Jobcentres makes them a unique data source for studying job matching patterns at the very
local level.
While the monthly series run from April 2004 onwards, we restrict our sample period to April
2004-April 2006, because from May 2006 Jobcentre Plus introduced changes to its vacancy handling
procedures, and the vacancy series since May 2006 are not fully comparable to those for the earlier
period.3
The data we use on the unemployed and vacancies cover a very large number of jobseekers and
vacancies and at a much more disaggregated level than available through any other source. In more
aggregate form these data have been used in other studies of the UK matching process (see, among
others, Coles and Smith, 1998, Burgess and Proﬁt, 2001, and Coles and Petrongolo, 2008). But,
one should realize they do not represent the universe of jobseekers or vacancies, and it is important
to get some idea of how much of the matching process is being captured by these data.
O nt h ew o r k e rs i d e ,n o ta l lj o b s e e k e r sa r ec l a i m ant-count unemployed, as jobseekers may also
be employed, or unemployed but not claiming beneﬁts; and not all the claimant unemployed may
be jobseekers (though they are meant to be according to the rules for beneﬁt entitlement). To get
some ideas of the numbers involved, we turn to the UK labour Force Survey (LFS), which asks a
direct question about job search both of those who are currently in and out of employment. In
the Spring of 2005 (to give one example) the LFS suggests there were about 3.1 million jobseekers
in the UK, and total employment was about 28.1 million. Almost exactly half of the jobseekers
were not currently employed, and at that time the oﬃcial ﬁgures for the claimant count was about
875,000. In the LFS, approximately 20% of the claimant unemployed do not report looking for
work in the past 4 weeks, suggesting that the claimant unemployed represent nearly a quarter of
total jobseekers in the economy.
It may be argued that the claimants are among the most intensive jobseekers (see, among others,
Flinn and Heckman, 1983, Jones and Riddell, 1999), and thus we weight jobseeker ﬁgures in the
3The vacancy data after May 2006 are less suitable for our purposes. Prior to May 2006, vacancies notiﬁed
to Jobcentre Plus were followed up with the employer until they were ﬁlled, and the number of vacancies ﬁlled
at Jobcentres was used as one of the main indicators of their performance. From May 2006, the Jobcentre Plus
performance evaluation is no longer based on vacancies being ﬁlled, thus vacancies notiﬁed to Jobcentre Plus are
not followed-up, and have an ex-ante closure date agreed with the employer, upon which they are automatically
withdrawn. This systematically understates the stock of unﬁlled vacancies from May 2006 onwards.
6LFS by the number of reported search methods used. During the 2002-2007 period,4 the unweighted
share of claimants in total jobseekers was 17.6%, while the weighted share was 23.7%. As one would
expect, the share of claimants in jobseekers also varies markedly with levels of education, being
15% among college graduates, 21.8% among those with ‘A levels’ (high school graduates), 24.9%
among GCSEs (who left school at 16), and 35.2% among those with no qualiﬁcations. This means
our study is best interpreted as being about lower-skill labour markets that probably tend to be
more ‘local’.
For our purpose it is also important to know the fraction of jobseekers who are looking at the
vacancies recorded in our data, i.e. vacancies advertised at Jobcentres. Using reported information
on the job-search methods used, during 2002-2007, 92% of claimants use Jobcentres, and 45.2%
of them report Jobcentres as their most important job-search method. These proportions fall to
44.4% and 18.3% for the non-claimant unemployed, and to 19.1% and 5.9% respectively for the
employed. So, Jobcentres are widely-used by the jobseekers in our sample. In this regard, it is
also important to realize that the UK Public Emplo y m e n tS e r v i c ei sm u c hm o r ew i d e l yu s e dt h a n
the US equivalent. Manning (2003, Table 10.5) shows that only 22% of the US unemployed report
using the PES compared to 75% of the UK unemployed, and OECD (2000, Table 4.2) shows that
the market share of the PES in the US in vacancy coverage and total hires is substantially lower
than in the UK. So, unlike the US, UK job centres do play an important role in matching jobseekers
and vacancies.
On the job vacancy side, there is fairly limited external evidence that we can use to assess the
representativeness of our Jobcentre data. Since 2001 the Vacancy Survey of the Oﬃce for National
Statistics provides comprehensive estimates of the number of job vacancies in the UK, obtained
from a sample of about 6,000 employers every month. Employers are asked how many job vacancies
there are in their business, for which they are actively seeking recruits from outside the business.
These vacancy data cover all sectors of the economy except agriculture, forestry and ﬁshing, but
are not disaggregated at the occupation or area level, so we can only make aggregate comparisons
between ONS and Jobcentre vacancy series.
On average, since April 2004, the Jobcentre vacancy series in the UK is about two thirds the
ONS series, but there are reasons to believe that such proportion may be overstated (Machin,
2001). In particular, in May 2002, an extra question was added to the ONS Vacancy Survey, on
whether vacancies reported had also been notiﬁed at Jobcentres, and based on this information the
ratio of total vacancies advertised at Jobcentres was 44%. While one should allow for sampling
variation (this information is only available for May 2002, and for only 420 respondents), this 44%
4We need to expand the sample period here with respect to that used in the main analysis in order to improve
precision of the statistics reported.
7proportion is markedly lower that the two thirds recorded for the post-2004 period. According
to Machin (2001), the main reason for this discrepancy is that Jobcentre vacancies obtained from
the computerized system may include vacancies which are “awaiting follow-up”, but which have
already been ﬁlled by employers, or which have been “suspended” by the Jobcentres, as it appears
that suﬃcient potential recruits have already been referred. Our vacancy series obtained from
Jobcentres (“live unﬁlled vacancies”) excludes suspended vacancies, but “may still include some
vacancies which have already been ﬁlled or are otherwise no longer open to recruits, due to natural
lags in procedures for following up vacancies with employers”,5 thus one can still imagine that
two-thirds is indeed an upper bound for the fraction of job openings that are eﬀectively available
to jobseekers at Jobcentres. As no occupation breakdown is available for the ONS vacancy series,
it is not possible to determine how the skill distribution of our vacancy data compares to that of
the whole economy, but it is very likely that Jobcentre vacancies over-represent less-skilled jobs.
From this discussion it should be clear that we capture an important section of both supply and
demand of the job search process in the UK, especially for low-skilled workers and jobs, but it is
also clear that we cannot provide a fully comprehensive picture. This would introduce a bias if the
portion of the job search process covered by our data varies systematically across areas, something
on which unfortunately we have no information. As a check against the possibility of gross biases
we also investigate how well our model explains the commuting ﬂows across wards using census
data that covers everyone in employment, no matter how they searched for jobs.
In the data presented below and in all estimated speciﬁcations, we obtain the vacancy and
unemployment outﬂo w sa sd i ﬀerences between the corresponding inﬂows and the monthly variations
in the stocks. For the unemployed, the outﬂow series predicted by the stock-ﬂow accounting
identity was virtually identical to that reported, while for vacancies the correlation was 0.81. Such
discrepancy may arise because the reported outﬂow does not include cases of “suspended” vacancies,
or cases of vacancies “awaiting follow-up”, but these may well be cases of positions being ﬁlled
without keeping the Jobcentre informed. Due to measurement error, for about 0.5% of observations
the vacancy outﬂow implied by the stock-ﬂow accounting identity is negative, and thus we drop
the corresponding observations.
Table 1 presents some simple descriptive statistics on unemployment and vacancies stocks and
ﬂows from May 2004-April 2006, a period of historically low and stable unemployment.6 English
wards have on average 106 unemployed and 91 vacancies. Taken across the whole period, both
unemployment and vacancy inﬂows and outﬂows seem very similar but with vacancy outﬂow slightly
5https://www.nomisweb.co.uk/articles/showArticle.asp?title=strongwarning: limitations of
data/strong&article=ref/vacs/warning-unﬁlled.htm
6We lose the initial month in the sample period because we need lags of the vacancy and unemployment stock
measures, i.e. values measured at the end of the previous month.
8lower than the inﬂow and the unemployment inﬂow slightly above the outﬂow. There is also very
wide spatial variation in unemployment and vacancies, which may be best grasped on a map. Figure
1 is a map of England and Wales, that shows spatial variation in the unemployment-to-vacancy ratio
for a representative month in our sample, February 2005. Diﬀerent wards are shaded according to
the quartile of the corresponding U-V ratios, with darker shades corresponding to higher quartiles.
The striking feature that emerges from this map is that there is no simple pattern - rather we
observe a patchwork of very diﬀerent labour market outcomes across quite small areas, e.g. many
high-unemployment wards are adjacent to low-unemployment wards so that one cannot detect one
large region in which, say, all high-unemployment wards are clustered together. Figure 2 shows
the same picture for London - one can observe the central business areas where the U-V ratio is
low and residential areas (especially in inner London) where the U-V ratios are high. But, again,
there is a patchwork quality to the picture - wards with unemployment/vacancy ratios in the top
quartile coexist next to areas with unemployment/vacancy ratios in the bottom quartile.
3 Non-structural estimates
We start our investigation of the data by estimating a conventional log-linear matching function
where the dependent variable is the vacancy outﬂow rate and the regressors are unemployment and






= 0 + 1 log( + 15 + 210 + 320 + 435) (1)
+2 log( + 15 + 210 + 320 + 435)+
where  is the vacancy outﬂow from ward ,  is the number of unemployed in ward , 5
is the number of unemployed in wards within 5km of  (excluding  itself), 10 is the number
of unemployed in wards between 5km and 10km of ward  etc., and similarly for vacancies. The
dependent variable is thus the vacancy outﬂow rate. The basic idea behind this speciﬁcation is
that the probability of ﬁlling a vacancy in  depends on local unemployment and on unemployment
in the surrounding areas, but that more distant unemployed workers are less eﬀective in ﬁlling a
vacancy in , i.e. we would expect   1. Similarly, more vacancies in area  and neighboring
wards might be expected to reduce the vacancy outﬂow rate in , but more distant vacancies have
as m a l l e re ﬀect, i.e. we expect   1.S p e c i ﬁcations similar to (1) have been estimated by Burda
and Proﬁt (1996) for Czech districts, and Burgess and Proﬁt (2001) and Patacchini and Zenou
(2007) for UK TTWAs.
Next deﬁne the total number of unemployed and vacancies within 10km of  to be:
e 10 =  + 5 + 10; e 10 =  + 5 + 10;



















































This speciﬁcation has the advantage to be linear in parameters, so that we can estimate various
speciﬁcations using instrumental variables and/or ward ﬁxed-eﬀects. Moreover, one can simply read
oﬀ the returns to scale in the matching function by a comparison of the coeﬃcients on log e 10 and
log e 10,w h i l et h ec o e ﬃcients on the share variables e 10,..., 35e 10,a n de 10,..., 35e 10
tell us about the relative eﬀectiveness of unemployment and vacancies at diﬀerent distances. The
decision to ‘normalize’ on unemployment and vacancies within 10km is essentially arbitrary but it
is important to choose a normalization for which 2 and 2 are not zero and for which the ‘share’
variables are not too large. In experimentation, 10km seemed about right to us. On average, about
5% of unemployment and vacancies within 10km are in the local ward, one-third are within 5km.
Moving beyond the 10km ring, there are about 4.5 times the number of unemployed and vacancies
between 10 and 20 km as within 10km and 16 times as many within 20km.
Estimates of (2) are reported in Table 2. In the ﬁrst column we simply pool all months and
wards without time or ward eﬀects. The estimates are in line with what we would expect. More
unemployed raise the probability of ﬁlling a vacancy while more vacancies reduce it. The coeﬃcients
on the unemployment and vacancy variables suggest something very close to constant returns — the
implied returns to scale parameter being 0.988. This is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from one but that is
largely a result of the large number of observations. It is not just the level of unemployment and
vacancies within 10km that aﬀect the outﬂow rate but also their geographical mix. As one might
expect, the more unemployed are close to the ward, the higher the probability of ﬁlling it. From
the coeﬃcients on the share of unemployment in the local ward and within 5km one can derive
an estimate of 2 of 0.22 and 1 of 0.48, i.e. unemployed workers outside the ward but with 5km
have 48% of the eﬀectiveness of generating matches as those within the ward and the unemployed
in the 5-10km ring have an eﬀectiveness of 22%. Unemployed in the 20k and 35k rings have tiny
eﬀects on the vacancy outﬂow, though these are statistically diﬀerent from zero. For vacancies, the
more local the vacancies the lower the outﬂow rate - as one would expect - as such jobs are closer
substitutes to local ones. Vacancies outside the ward but within 5km have 28% of the eﬀectiveness
of those within the ward, and vacancies in the 5-10km ring have an eﬀectiveness of 21%. Vacancies
in the 20k and 35k rings have very small eﬀects on the vacancy outﬂow rate.
The second column introduces time dummies: the main consequence of this is a very slight
attenuation of all the coeﬃcients but the qualitative conclusions remain similar. The third column
10instruments the vacancy variables using their one-month lags. Our reason for showing this speci-
ﬁcation is that the dependent variable is obtained by dividing the recorded outﬂows by the local
stock of vacancies and this local stock also appears in the construction of some of the right-hand
side variables. This means that a division bias is s u em i g h to c c u ri ft h e r ea r em e a s u r e m e n tp r o b l e m s
with the current vacancy stock. The estimates in the second and third column are very similar,
with the possible exception of vacancies within 10km that are in the local ward. It is exactly this
variable where the local vacancy stock has the most inﬂuence so this is perhaps some indication that
there are modest issues of division bias in the estimates. The fourth column introduces lagged
unemployment as an instruments for the unemployment variables and the results are virtually
unchanged from those of column 3.
The ﬁfth column introduces ward ﬁxed eﬀects. Comparing the estimates in the second and ﬁfth
columns one notes that the coeﬃcient on the share of vacancies in the local ward becomes much
more negative and that the coeﬃcients on the unemployment variables are attenuated and even
perversely signed. The change in the coeﬃcient of the local vacancy share is what one would expect
if again there are division bias issues, as it is now only the within-ward variation in vacancies that is
being exploited, and that probably has more transitory components. The sixth column re-estimates
using instrumental variables and the coeﬃcient on the local vacancy share is reduced as one would
expect. The attenuation of the coeﬃcients on the unemployment variables in speciﬁcations with
ward ﬁxed eﬀects is most likely caused by the fact that unemployment rates within wards are much
more stable than vacancy rates, i.e. some neighborhoods have persistently high unemployment
rates, some persistently low unemployment rates. This implies that most of the useful variation
in investigating spatial matching is cross-sectional and that is what we are going to exploit in our
structural estimates. To allay fears that we are simply picking up ﬁxed ward characteristics that
are correlated with unemployment rates we do experiment with including other ward-level controls.
The log-linear matching functions estimated in Table 2 are standard in the literature but have
the disadvantage that the dependent variable is not deﬁned when the outﬂow rate is zero. Although
this is not an issue in existing empirical studies of the matching function because of their higher
level of aggregation, it becomes a potential issue when using data on very small areas, and indeed in
our sample 6.2% of observations have zero outﬂows. There are a number of approaches one might
take to dealing with this. Here, we will estimate vacancy outﬂow rate equations like (2) in levels
instead of logs. In the next section we will present a model in which the functional form in levels
can be thought of as a legitimate speciﬁcation of the expected outﬂow rate given unemployment
and vacancies. The functional form used in this section has the disadvantage that the ‘predicted’
value need not be between zero and one but has the advantage that one can compare estimates
with the log-linear matching functions.
11The ﬁrst column of Table 3 presents estimates of a log-linear matching function but excluding
unemployment and vacancies more than 10km distant, as Table 2 has suggested that the impact of
these distant unemployment and vacancies was negligible. The second column then estimates the
level version of this equation by non-linear least squares, excluding observations with zero vacancy
outﬂow, thus on the same sample as in the ﬁrst column. The estimates are qualitatively similar
but one does notice a considerable reduction in the size of the coeﬃcients on all ratio variables.
Finally, the third column presents the levels model but includes the ‘zeroes’, i.e. the estimation
method is the same as in the second column, but with a larger sample size. The estimates obtained
are very close to those reported in the second column. Finally the fourth and ﬁfth columns report
results for the log-linear and linear models estimated for one month only (February 2005), that will
feature in some of the structural estimates below.
T h er e s u l t so fT a b l e2a n d3a r ec o n s i s t e n tw i t has i mple matching model with spatial spillovers.
However, these estimated equations do have their limitations for making inferences about the
size of local labour markets. First, they do not allow us to estimate where those who are ﬁlling
the vacancies actually live, whether they are predominantly local or more distant. Data that
provided information on where the successful job applicant lived could answer that question. But
the estimated equations are also not very informative about the reasons for the spillovers — at best,
they represent a description of the data. When it is shown that an increase in the number of
unemployed 10km away raises the probability of ﬁlling a vacancy in area , is this because those
unemployed workers apply for vacancies in  or because they apply for vacancies local to them
which then become harder to obtain causing workers 5km away from  to shift their job search
eﬀorts towards vacancies in area ? To answer this question we need a more structural model of
job search and that is what the next section provides.
4 The Structural Model
The key ingredient of our methodology consists in relating job matches in a given area to the number
of applications received by job vacancies in that area. The novel element is to base the empirical
speciﬁcation on a model of optimizing job search behavior across space that makes predictions
about the number of applications from unemployed workers in one area to vacancies in every other
area. Our approach is then to use the expected number of applicants for a job in an area as a
measure both of how easy it will be for an employer in that area to ﬁll a vacancy and a measure of
how much competition for a job in that area there is for a worker who is considering applying to a
vacancy there.
We next outline a model of the process by which unemployed workers determine the number of
12job applications they make and their distribution over space, and we will then relate applications
to job matches.
4.1 The application process
At any moment in time there are  unemployed workers and  v a c a n c i e si ne a c ha r e a of the
economy Denote by ( ) the vector of unemployed workers and vacancies across areas.
Suppose that individuals are deciding how many of the existing vacancies to apply for. Because
of the time lag in the process of ﬁlling jobs, they cannot apply sequentially to vacancies, thus
applications are simultaneous. Assume that an application to vacancy  has a probability  of
being successful, and generates utility  in that case. Assume further that the probability of more
than one application being successful is inﬁnitesimal so that expected returns from search for a




where  is a binary variable taking the value 1 if an individual applies to the job and zero if they

















The optimal application rule is to apply for a vacancy if the expected utility from doing so is higher








This result says that the attractiveness of vacancies is determined by the expected utility they
oﬀer, and jobseekers apply ﬁrst for jobs oﬀering the highest expected utility and continue to do so
until expected utility is below the marginal cost of an extra job application. Another implication
of this is that whether the individual applies for a particular vacancy or not depends only on the
expected utility it oﬀers and the marginal cost of an application. Other vacancies only aﬀect this
decision through the eﬀect on the marginal beneﬁt of an application.7
7While extremely convenient, it is important to note that the assumption that the probability of more than one
application being successful is inﬁnitesimal plays an important role here — if this assumption is not met then one
cannot rank vacancies by their expected utility and the decision-problem does not lead to such a simple rule. To
see this more formally, suppose that we can order jobs in terms of utility, with job 1 oﬀering a higher utility than
job 2 and so on. Furthermore, assume that the jobs that oﬀer a higher utility have a lower probability of success
so that 1  2   (i.e. that dominated jobs are not applied for). In this case a worker will only accept job  if
13In what follows we will assume that the probability of ﬁlling a vacancy and of success in a
particular application depends on the expected number of applications to that job, that we denote
by . Denote the probability of being the successful applicant by (),w i t h0()  0. The extent
to which the probability of success is related to the number of applicants is an important parameter
in the model - we will refer to it as the congestion parameter.
The parameter  (or, more accurately, a transformation of it) will turn out to be key in deter-
mining the returns to scale in the model. The issue of constant versus increasing returns to scale is
a recurrent question in the matching literature, as increasing returns to scale lead to the possibility
of multiple equilibria (Diamond, 1982) and are a potential explanation for agglomeration, as large-
scale markets would oﬀer a more eﬃcient matching process that can, in principle, oﬀ-set higher
land and labour costs of locating in agglomerations. So it is worth taking some time to understand
t h er o l eo ft h e parameter in this framework and its link to returns to scale.
If  =0  there is a constant marginal cost of an application and an unemployed worker will apply
for a vacancy if the expected utility is above this marginal cost. In this situation a doubling in the
number of vacancies will lead to a doubling in the number of applications each unemployed worker
makes. The average number of applicants per vacancy will remain unchanged, so it is plausible
to think that the probability of ﬁlling each vacancy will remain unchanged. The total number of
matches will then also double. In this situation there are constant returns to scale to vacancies
alone. If one doubles both vacancies and the number of unemployed workers then the number of
applications will rise four-fold as the applications per worker will double and the number of workers
double. This implies increasing returns to scale.
At the other extreme, consider  = ∞. This should really be thought of as the case where each
unemployed worker has a ﬁxed number of applications to make and will apply to those vacancies
that oﬀer the highest expected utility. In this case a doubling of vacancies and unemployment will
lead to a doubling of applications, as applications per worker are unchanged and the number of
the unemployed has risen. Hence applications per vacancy are unaltered, the probability of ﬁlling
a vacancy is unaltered and the total number of matches will double. This corresponds to the case
of constant returns to scale.
Our set-up makes it harder to rationalize the possibility of decreasing returns to scale, for
which we would have to introduce some extra form of congestion in the model. But, the estimates
presented so far are very close to constant returns to scale for the economy as a whole. However,




 which leads to a decision rule in which the marginal beneﬁto fa p p l y i n gt ov a c a n c y can
be written as  ( − )(1− ) where  is the probability of getting a better job than  and  is the expected
utility from jobs worse than , conditional on a better job not being obtained. The eﬀect of other applications on the
decision to apply to vacancy  is no longer only contained in the eﬀect on marginal costs. But the diﬀerence between
this specifciation of marginal beneﬁt and the one we use will be small if  and  are small.
14this is perfectly consistent with decreasing returns to vacancies and unemployment in individual
areas - typically doubling vacancies and unemployment in a particular area will result in a lower
probability of ﬁlling jobs in that area.
To put more structure on the problem, assume that the utility from a job in area  for someone
from area  is given by
 = 
where  represents the intrinsic attractiveness of a job in area  for someone in area  and  is
an idiosyncratic component which we assume to have a Pareto distribution with exponent .A
natural speciﬁcation for  is a function declining with the distance between  and  so that jobs
in more distant areas are less attractive.
Hence, using (4), an individual in  applies to a vacancy in  if
() ≥ 

where  denotes the total number of applications made by each worker in . Given the assumption










Although there is some uncertainty about whether an individual applies to a particular vacancy
(because of the idiosyncratic component to utility), let us assume that we can apply a law of large
numbers so that the total number of applications can be treated as non-stochastic. We will thus










Adding up the ’s across all possible destination areas  gives the total number of applications





















where  =1 (1 + ) The case of a constant marginal cost of an application,  =0 , corresponds
to  =1 ,w h i l et h ec a s eo faﬁxed number of applications,  = ∞, corresponds to  =0 .
15Using (6) and (7), one can compute the total number of applications made by the unemployed
in  to vacancies in , ,a s









The intuition behind expression (8) is that the number of applications sent from area  to area
 depends on job opportunities in area  (), how attainable they are (()), and how far they
are located from  (). The term in square brackets can be interpreted as a weighted average of
vacancies everywhere in the country, where weights are given by a combination of their attainability
and distance to .T h i st e r mc a p t u r e st h e‘ e ﬀective’ size of the whole economy, and would simply
work as a normalization in the case of constant returns ( =0 ).
The number of applications received by vacancies in  is equal to all applications that unem-
ployed workers decide the send to area  from all areas . Thus the ratio of applications per vacancy
















Equation (9) simply tells that the number of applications per job in area  depends on the distri-
bution of the unemployed across all possible origin areas  (), how far they are located from 
(), and how attainable they perceive job vacancies in  to be (()).
To take equation (9) to the data, we make two further functional form assumptions, and namely
()=
− 
 ,w h e r ee 0 denotes the eﬀect of job competition on applications to jobs in a given
area,8 and  =e x p ( −e ),w h e r e may be proxied by distance between  and ,a n de  measures
the exponential rate of decay of the attractiveness of a given job with distance to that job.9 Under
8The functional form ()=
− 
 can be derived from a more structural urn-ball model describing how vacancies
are ﬁlled. Let’s denote by  the probability that any particular candidate is acceptable for a given job vacancy. The
probability that a ﬁrm does not ﬁll the vacancy is (1−)
; the probability that the vacancy is ﬁlled is 1−(1−)
;
and the probability that any particular applicant is selected is [1−(1−)
]. We approximate this expression as

− 
 . Both expressions are decreasing and convex in ,s ow ew o u l db eﬁtting similar functional forms to our data,
but using the 
− 
 approximation instead of the exact formula makes the model a great deal more tractable.
9While we are only taking into account horizontal heterogeneity between workers and jobs, represented by distance,
this model could be generalized to allow for some form of vertical heterogeneity between jobs at diﬀerent locations.
For example, workers at all locations positively value the wage attached to a job oﬀer, and thus, other things equal,
receive higher utility from applying to jobs in high-wage areas than to jobs in low-wage areas. In this case one could
have  =e x p ( − )+,w h e r e denotes destination-speciﬁc characteristics, and  is the associated eﬀect
on utility. While local wages are the most natural proxy for , at the moment we do not have access to earnings
information at the ward level, and thus simply model the attractiveness of a location as a function of the distance to
that location.



















where  = e  and  ≡ e 
Equation (10) is the key relationship delivered by our spatial job search model, and captures
all the inter-dependencies between areas. In particular, the number of applicants to jobs in  is
likely to be inﬂuenced (even if only very slightly) by unemployment and vacancies in all other areas,
because they are ultimately linked through a series of overlapping labour markets. This expression
might be thought impossibly diﬃcult to solve as, if we have 8,850 wards, it has 8,850 equations
in 8,850 unknowns. But, under reasonable conditions, it can be shown that (10) is a contraction
mapping, in which case it can be solved iteratively and economically to obtain .
















Think of this as a mapping from one set of log applications across areas to a new set - denote
this mapping by (ln). To apply Blackwell’s suﬃcient conditions consider (ln + ).S i m p l e





It is worth discussing why we can only identify  = e  and  ≡ e , and not all the underlying
structural parameters. The reason is that an increase in the size of the idiosyncratic component
of the utility from a job — measured by  — is observationally equivalent to a change in the cost
of distance or the eﬀect of congestion on the probability of obtaining a job. If the idiosyncratic
component is very small, then, for the same number of applicants, a worker is very likely to apply
to a closer job rather than one that is more distant. In other words, this scenario has observable
consequences equivalent to one with a higher cost of distance but a more important idiosyncratic
component. Similarly for the eﬀect of the number of applicants, holding distance to a job constant.
A useful result that can be obtained from (10) is that  is homogeneous of degree (1 + )
in  and  , and this relates to the returns to scale in the matching process. In particular, when
 =0 , the matching process displays constant returns to scale, while (1 + )  0 would imply
increasing returns. This can be seen more clearly in the special case in which areas are isolated,
such that  = 0 for  = ,a n d =0for  6= . In this case it can be shown that the
number of applications per vacancy in an area can be written as a function of the U-V ratio in the
17area and the overall level of vacancies (though one could also re-write it as a function of the total















[ln()+l n ( )] (13)
As the vacancy outﬂow rate in an area depends on the number of applications per job in that area,
expression (13) implies a relationship between the vacancy outﬂow rate, the local U-V ratio, and
the level of vacancies, which is very similar to the log-linear matching function usually estimated
in the literature (see Petrongolo and Pissarides, 2001). When  =0the number of applications per
job only responds to the ratio of unemployment to vacancies, and is not aﬀected by the size of the
labour market, represented by , implying constant returns.
To summarize, one can think of our model as having three key parameters:
• , a measure of the cost of distance;
• , a measure of the congestion parameter, that measures how much workers are deterred from
applying to jobs in areas where they expect a large number of applications;
• , the returns to scale of the matching function.
Finally, one might also notice that (10) also contains a ‘constant’, . But, one can normalize
this to one without loss of generality as the number of applications per vacancy is not something
that is actually observed in our data, just a theoretical construct. This also means that it makes no
sense to actually discuss the computed number of applications per vacancy as a guide to whether
the model is ‘plausible’ or not. What is observed is the actual number of matches that we posit to
be related to the number of applications per vacancy. We next turn to that relationship.
4.2 From applications to job matches
We use the vacancy outﬂow in an area as a proxy of job matches, and we express the vacancy






= Ψ() Ψ0(·)  0 (14)
Various functional forms have been used in the literature for estimating Ψ,b a s e do np o s s i b l e
microfoundations of the matching function and empirical tractability. The simplest way to justify
a matching function like (14) is to think of an urn-ball problem,10 in which ﬁrms play the role
of urns and applications the role of balls. Because of a coordination failure, a random placing of
10See Butters (1977) and Pissarides (1979) for early microfoundations of the matching function based on an urn-ball
model.
18the balls in the urns implies that some urns will end up with more than one ball and some with
none. Thus an uncoordinated application process will lead to overcrowding in some jobs and no
applications in others.
Conditional on receiving an application, a vacancy may still remain unﬁlled if one allows for
worker heterogeneity and thus the possibility that the applicant may not be suitable for the job.
The probability that a given job applicant is selected for a job is 
−
 . Thus the probability that
a given vacancy is not ﬁlled by any applicant is (1 − 
−
 ), and the vacancy outﬂow rate is
 =1− (1 − 
−
 ). For small enough 
−
 , (1 − 
−
 ) ' exp(−
1−











where we have added a non-negative multiplicative constant exp() a n da ne r r o rt e r m The term
exp()
1−
 represents the continuous-time hazard at which vacancies are ﬁlled.
Alternatively, a simple log-linear speciﬁcation can be estimated, i.e.


=e x p ( )
1−
 +  (16)
T h en i c ef e a t u r eo ft h eu r n - b a l ls p e c i ﬁcation is that it ensures a vacancy outﬂow rate between 0
and 1, while this is of course not imposed by the log linear speciﬁcation. However, the log linear
speciﬁcation has the advantage that it yields a constant elasticity of the vacancy outﬂow with
respect to the number of jobseekers and vacancies, and this property allows us to more easily assess
the returns to scale in matching. As we will note below, the results are virtually identical with the
two speciﬁcations. Whether estimating (15) or (16),  is implicitly deﬁned by (10), and thus ,
,  are further parameters to be estimated. In practice we estimate (15) and (16) by maximum
likelihood, and at every iteration of the maximization solve the contraction mapping in (10).11
In both of these speciﬁcations one can see that the normalization of the number of applications
discussed above is, indeed, without loss of generality. If one changed the normalization one would
simply change the parameters relating the number of applications to the vacancy outﬂow and the
overall ﬁt of the model would be the same.
One may wonder about the relationship between our model of the job search process that is based
on vacancies receiving a number of applications and then, possibly, choosing one of the applicants,
a n dt h em o r ec o m m o nm o d e l l i n gs t r a t e g yi nw h i c ht h e r ei sa na r r i v a lr a t eo fj o ba p p l i c a n t sa n dt h e
ﬁrst acceptable one is chosen (e.g. Pissarides, 2000). However, one could reinterpret the number of
applications in our modelling strategy as a decision about the rate at which to apply for jobs and
there is then the distribution of these applications over vacancies in diﬀerent areas. That would also
11Again, to avoid dropping observations with zero outﬂows, both (15) and (16) are estimated in levels instead of
logs.
19lead to a speciﬁcation that related the outﬂow rate to the number of ‘applicants’, but the number
of applicants should be re-interpreted as the rate at which job applicants apply to the ﬁrm.
Our overall approach has some similarities to the way in which economists in Industrial Orga-
nization have modelled markets. One can think of a ‘product’ as being a job in a particular area.
Compared to most applications in Industrial Organization we have a very large number of ‘products’
but we also have a priori information on which of these products are the closest substitutes - those
closer in space - which allows us to reduce the dimensionality of product heterogeneity. Consumers
are also diﬀerentiated - in our application, this is by space, the same diﬀerentiation as the products
- though there is nothing inevitable about this. One can think of our information on unemployment
and vacancies as being information on the level of demand by diﬀerent types of consumers and the
level of supply of diﬀerent products. Our variable ‘applications per vacancy’ functions rather like
a price in the sense that more applications discourage consumers from purchasing a product of a
particular type and encourage them to take their demand to other products. Our outcome variable,
the number of matches, can be thought of as representing the market outcome in a quantity space.
The equation we estimate is essentially a reduced-form equation for the quantity traded as a func-
tion of the demand and supply fundamentals. One hopes to retrieve the estimates of the demand
functions because of the assumption that the supply of vacancies is exogenously ﬁxed. Given this
discussion, one might wonder why we do not include an explicit price, the wage, in the model. By
raising the oﬀered wage, employers would be expected to be able to attract more workers. That
would be an interesting extension of the model but we currently have no data on wages at the ward
level, so we are forced to abstract from them.
5R e s u l t s
5.1 Main estimates
Our ﬁrst set of results is based on an urn-ball speciﬁcation of the matching function, as shown in
equation (15). For reasons of computing capacity, we cannot estimate our regression equation on
the whole sample period, and we thus estimate it separately for each month from May 2004-April
2006. This, however, does have the advantage that we can think of each month’s estimate as a draw
from the data (not necessarily independent, and we can look for serial correlation in the estimates),
so giving us an idea of the standard error of our estimates from the diﬀerent months, which we can
then compare with that produced by our structural estimation method. We thus estimate our main
speciﬁcation separately for each month, and then run a number of speciﬁcations and robustness
checks on a representative month.
In Table 4 we report time averages of the parameters of interest, together with their standard
20deviations, minimum and maximum values. The utility of a job in  for a worker located in  is
modeled based on the geographic distance between  and  and thus  represents the exponential
rate of decay of a job’s attractiveness with distance in km to that job. An average  of 0.3 is
consistent with relatively fast decay of job utility with distance. For example, the attractiveness of
a job falls by about 4.5 times whenever one moves the job 5 km further aﬁeld from a jobseeker’s
location. The congestion parameter  is positive, implying that the probability of being selected
for a given job opening falls with the number of applicants, with an average elasticity of about 0.75.
As a corollary, jobseekers respond to strong job competition in a ward by reducing applications to
that ward. The elasticity of the vacancy ﬁlling hazard with respect to applications is given by 1−
(see equation (15)), thus vacancy duration falls by 25% when the number of applications doubles.
The average estimate for  is negative, implying decreasing returns in matching, although the low
point estimate suggests a scenario very close to constant returns. Overall, both  and  appear
to be precisely estimated over the sample period, but there is slightly more variation in .I fo n e
is willing to make the hypothesis that the month-to-month variation in the relevant variables is
largely driven by independent, random shocks, then the average parameter estimates and associated
standard deviations can be used for bootstrap inference. Thus one can conclude that while both 
and  are highly statistically signiﬁcant,  is not statistically diﬀerent from zero.
In Figure 1 we plot point estimates of these parameters over the 24 months in our sample. The
series ﬂuctuate somewhat over the sample period, but show no deﬁnite trend, and we could detect
no signiﬁcant serial correlation of either ﬁrst or second order in   or 
In Table 5 we report estimates of alternative speciﬁcations of the job application model for
February 2005, and Table A1 in the Appendix reports the corresponding estimates for the whole
sample period, obtained again as averages of monthly estimates for May 2004-April 2006. The
simple criteria used for picking a reference month in Table 5 is that it should not be December or
a summer month, and that the parameter estimates for this month should be quite close to the
sample averages to make the estimates of Table 5 well representative for the whole sample period.
Here we will not comment the average estimates of Table A1 separately, because indeed they are
very close to those reported in Table 5, both in terms of parameter estimates and their standard
errors.
Column 1 in Table 5 estimates the basic speciﬁcation of an urn-ball matching function, with
the attractiveness of jobs represented by distance to the jobseeker’s location, corresponding to the
speciﬁcation of Table 3. The associated standard errors are corrected for some (arbitrary) structure
of spatially correlated shocks.12 Both  and  are highly statistically signiﬁcant, while  is not
12In particular, we assume that spatial correlation across wards decays at rate  with ward distance or commuting
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21statistically diﬀerent from zero. To determine the returns to scale in the matching function, recall
that  is homogeneous of degree (1+) in  and  . Thus the returns to scale can be obtained
multiplying by (1 + ) the elasticity of matches with respect to applications. Such elasticity is
equal to (1 − )()(1 − )exp()
1−
 , and can be computed using estimates of  and
 and predicted values for  and . The sample average of this expression equals -0.011,
implying a returns-to-scale estimate of 0.989, which is very close to constant returns.
Column 2 tries to assess whether job applications are a suﬃcient statistic for describing local
job matches. In other words we test whether local unemployment still retains some explanatory
power on local job matches, once one controls for applications per job as predicted by the model.













where  is obtained from the contraction mapping (10) and the local unemployment to vacancy
ratio is included as an extra regressor in the matching equation. Column 2 shows that the main
parameter estimates ,  and  stay virtually unchanged from the speciﬁcation of column 1, and
that the local unemployment to vacancy ratio has a small, though statistically signiﬁcant, impact
on the matching rate. Although the coeﬃcient on the unemployment to vacancy ratio is much
lower than the coeﬃcient on applications, given by 1 −  =0 207,t h i sﬁnding would point at a
failure of our job application model, namely there are some local eﬀects in matching that a simple
job application model across space fails to capture.
Similarly as we noted for the log linear matching functions estimated in Section 3, there may be
a problem of division bias here if the vacancy stock is measured with some error, as it appears at the
denominator of both the dependent variable and of one of the right-hand side variables. A simple
way to address the division bias problem in this context (analogous to a ‘control function’ approach)
consists in including the vacancy stock among right-hand side variables, with exponent 2 This
would reveal whether the positive estimated impact of  in column 2 stems from its numerator
or denominator. Column 3 shows that the impact of the  ratio on the vacancy outﬂow rate is
somewhat reduced, and becomes insigniﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero, when one controls for the total
vacancy stock.
In column 4 we estimate a similar speciﬁcation to that of column 1, having expressed the job
matching rate as a log-linear function of applications per job, as in equations (16). While estimates
are very similar to those obtained on an urn-ball matching function, the log-linear speciﬁcation has
the advantage of delivering a constant elasticity of the matching rate with respect to applications,
where  
2 is the sum of squared residuals divided by the number of observations,   is the matrix of partial derivatives
of the regression function with respect to right-hand side variables, and the spatial correlation matrix  Ω is proxied
by exp(− ) where  is given by the distance matrix, and   is the associated parameter estimate.
22equal to 1−.A s  is homogeneous of degree (1+) in  and  , this would in turn deliver
an elasticity of the matching rate with respect to  and  equal to (1 − )(1 + ).U s i n g
estimates from column 4, this is equal to −0008. A wald test on this statistics gives a 2 value
of 0.193, which falls below the 5% critical value of 3.84, thus the hypothesis of constant returns to
scale cannot be rejected.
5.2 Robustness tests
In our main estimates we have modelled distance between wards using physical distance. In this
section we explore diﬀerent alternative ways of modelling distance. In column 5 of Table 5 we
estimate an urn-ball matching function, having modelled the utility of jobs at diﬀerent locations
as a function of commuting times, expressed in one-way commuting minutes.13 The results are
fairly similar to those based on geographic distance, with the job congestion estimate at 0.75, and
again close to constant returns to scale. What diﬀers from column 1 is of course the estimate of
the  parameter, being based on a diﬀerent distance metrics. To give an idea of magnitudes, the
attractiveness of a given job is reduced by a factor of 2.7 should one increase by 5 minutes the
one-way commuting time to a job. In column 6, distance is measured by one-way commuting costs,
and the corresponding  estimate implies that the attractiveness of a job is halved for each extra
£1 added to the one-way commuting cost (at 2001 prices).
All three measures of distance - physical distance, commuting time and commuting costs - yield
a very high decay of the probability of applying to a given job with distance. While these estimates
are obtained on a relatively unskilled sample, for which the labour market may be more local than
for the universe of jobseekers, the estimates of Bonhomme and Jolivet (2009) are suggestive of very
high distance costs on a sample that is representative of the overall population. Using information
on job satisfaction from the ECHPS, they ﬁnd that workers in Europe are typically willing to forgo
large fractions of their salaries to become satisﬁed with their commuting distances/costs, ranging
from 40% in France to 14% in Austria. Unfortunately, they do not report estimates for the UK.
We ﬁnally consider that target labour markets may diﬀer not only in terms of geographic distance
(or commuting costs) from an applicant’s location, but they may also diﬀer in terms of the skill
composition of available jobs, as measured by occupations. We thus construct an index of mismatch
between the skill composition of each origin labour market and that of each destination labour market,
based on the occupational composition of claimants and job vacancies.14 In particular, we extract
data on claimants and job vacancies by CAS ward and 1-digit occupation, and construct the
13The data on commuting costs were obtained from Daniel Graham at Imperial College and have their origins in
transport planning.
14For the unemployed the occupation refers to the type of job sought.
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where the occupation categories considered are: (1) managers and professionals; (2) associate
professionals and technical occupations; (3) administrative and secretarial occupations; (4) skilled
trades occupations; (5) personal service occupations; (6) sales and customer service occupations;
(7) process, plant and machine operatives; (8) elementary occupations. We then express the utility
of a job in area  f o ra nu n e m p l o y e di na r e a as a function of both the geographic distance and
the occupational mismatch index in (18):
 =e x p ( − − )
where  is an extra parameter to be identiﬁed. The results are reported in column 7, where the
estimate for  is positive and signiﬁcant, implying that the unemployed would be discouraged to
send applications in areas where the array of jobs available would not match their sought occupa-
tion. Quantitatively though, the impact of occupational mismatch on job applications is relatively
modest. The mismatch index obtained has an average of 1.067, with a standard deviation of 0.042.
Thus a one standard deviation increase in the mismatch index would imply a fall in the utility of
applying to a given area by 3.2%, while a one standard deviation increase in distance would imply
a fall in such utility by 98.7%.
To conclude, we compare the relative merits of the job application model with the conventional
matching function in vacancies and unemployment in the speciﬁcation of column 8, which only
includes  as a regressor. The coeﬃcient on  is positive and signiﬁcant, although the
adjusted 2 is substantially lower than that obtained when estimating the job application model
of column 1. Thus the job application model seems to perform better at explaining the variation
in job matching rates than the simple matching function in unemployment and vacancies only.
5.3 Worker interactions and commuting ﬂows
One idea that has received a fair amount of attention in recent years is that networks are important
in labour markets and that a good source (though not the only source) of contacts is one’s neighbors.
In this case one would expect to see clusters of ﬂows from one area to another, which are the
outcome of these networks. The empirical studies by Topa (2001), Bayer, Ross and Topa (2008)
and Hellerstein, McInerney and Neumark (2011) all contain evidence on the importance of residence-
based networks. Topa (2001) presents evidence of positive correlation between unemployment in a
neighborhood and others that are physically close to it. While social interactions are one possible
24explanation for this, so is our distance based model of the labour market and so might be residential
segregation. Bayer et al. (2008) show that workers who live on the same block are signiﬁcantly
more likely to work in the same block. However the probability that pairs who reside in the same
block also work in the same block is 0.48%, i.e. 1 in 200 workers, perhaps not as high as one might
expect if networks are very important. Hellerstein et al. (2011) take this further as they have
matched employer-employee data that enables them to show that workers who work in the same
ﬁrm are signiﬁcantly more likely to live in the same census tract than those who work in the same
census tract but in diﬀerent ﬁrms. However, the baseline probabilities are, again, quite small.
The way in which we investigate the social network hypothesis is the following. From the
Special Workforce Statistics of the 2001 Census we have data on commuting ﬂows between every
ward (albeit with some noise deliberately introduced to preserve anonymity in cells with small
numbers). We think of these commuting ﬂo w sa sl i n k a g e sb e t w e e nw a r d st h a te x i s t e dp r i o rt o
the period of our data. So, if networks are important we might expect to see that, controlling for
distance, unemployed workers are more likely to apply for jobs in wards towards which there is a
large commuting ﬂow from their own location. So we include the commuting ﬂow in addition to
our distance measure, i.e.
 =e x p ( − ∗  +  ∗ )
where  denotes the number of individuals resident in  who commute to . The commuting
ﬂow  is, of course, endogenous, but the likely bias is in an upward direction. For example, if
two wards are linked by a superfast bus service then this will lead to large commuting ﬂows, given
the (mis)measured distance.
The results for February 2005 are reported in Table 6, where each column uses a diﬀerent proxy
for the cost of distance. In all speciﬁcations, commuting ﬂows have a negative rather than positive
impact on the attractiveness of jobs at various locations. When distance is measured in kilometers,
the coeﬃcient on commuting ﬂows is high, negative and signiﬁcant, and when distance is measured
in either commuting time of commuting cost, the coeﬃcient on commuters falls in both absolute
size and signiﬁcance, but it remains ﬁrmly negative. The corresponding average estimates over the
s a m p l ep e r i o da r er e p o r t e di nT a b l eA 2i nt h eA p p endix, and the results are very close to those
reported in Table 6, although it has to be noted that the coeﬃcients on the commuters variable
display quite a bit more variation over the sample period than other coeﬃcients in the regression.
Overall, we ﬁnd little evidence here for residence-based networks being quantitatively important,
which is fairly consistent with the evidence presented in the other studies discussed above.
255.4 Predicted commuting ﬂows
Our estimated model of job applications across space has predictions for commuting patterns among
wards in our sample. In particular, the share of applications to ward  that come from ward  is
given by the number of applications that the unemployed in  send to jobs in , divided by the




As ﬁrms are assumed to select jobseekers randomly within the pool of job applicants, the ratio in
(19) also denotes the proportion of total matches in ward  that involve jobseekers from ward .




Finally one can obtain the distribution of commutes predicted by the model as the share of workers




We can compare these predictions with the Census data on commuting used in the previous
section. These two concepts of commuting may not coincide if, for example, workers who move from
one job to another tend, on average, to shorten their commute, or if jobseekers ﬁlling Jobcentre
vacancies have diﬀerent commuting patterns from jobseekers who ﬁnd their jobs via other methods.
However, we do have some indirect evidence that this potential concern is not a major one. The
UK LFS contains data on commuting times for those in new jobs and those in continuing jobs and,
for those in new jobs, on how that job was obtained. Table 7 presents evidence on the average length
of commute for these groups. One notices very little variation in the average commute between
the group of workers whom we model — those who have recently got a job through a Jobcentre —
and the overall employed population. As the characteristics of workers in diﬀerent categories may
diﬀer, and they may be related to commuting times, we also compared diﬀerences in commuting
times controlling for the method used to ﬁnd the current job, age, gender, region and year (results
not reported), and we found no signiﬁcant diﬀerence between commuting times of those who found
jobs via Jobcentres and those who are not on new jobs. So, we feel justiﬁed in comparing the
commutes predicted by our model with the data for all workers.
Using estimates from a job applications model with an urn-ball matching function (column 1
in Table 5), we estimate that the correlation between actual and predicted commuting ﬂows — as
implied by (21) — is 0.71. This is the pairwise correlation between two matrices of commuting
26ﬂows (actual and predicted), which include several zeros, thus one may worry that a relatively high
correlation between the two could be driven by the vast proportion of cells in either matrix with
zero commuters. But when we restrict to cells with nonzero commuters we still obtain a correlation
of 0.69.
Interestingly, the correlation between actual and predicted commuting rises to 0.83 if one ex-
cludes ‘locals’ from the sample, i.e. individuals who live and work in the same ward (and this stays
unchanged if we further exclude cells with zero commuters). Thus our model provides a fairly good
representation of commuting patterns, but it reproduces the behavior of those who live and work
in the same ward less accurately than that of commuters. This can be seen more clearly comparing
the distributions of actual and predicted commuting ﬂows, as shows in Table 8. Both distributions
are hump-shaped, with a peak in the (0,5] km range, but the model tends to underpredict locals
and as a consequence to overpredict short-distance commuters. In particular, the model predicts
that about 10% of individuals live and work in the same area, while in reality this proportion is
about 24%. Thus our model overestimates the number of commuters and it underestimates the
number of locals. This is consistent with the ﬁnding that the local unemployment to vacancy ratio
still plays some role in explaining variations in matching rates, having controlled for applications
per job as predicted by the model.
6 Evaluating Location-Based Policies
6.1 Local Labour Demand Stimulus
A key policy question for addressing spatial inequalities is whether one can alleviate unemployment
in a depressed area using local stimulus to labour demand, or whether local stimulus is ineﬀective
because it becomes diluted across space through a chain reaction of local spillovers. To answer
this question we introduce a labour demand shock in a given ward, and we use model predictions to
simulate the eﬀect of this shock locally and its decay with distance from the target ward.
As an example, we consider an increase in the number of job openings in Stratford and New
Town ward in East London, which is the main venue of the 2012 Olympic Games. In February 2005,
Stratford and New Town had ratio of claimant unemployment to resident population of 6%, which
was nearly three times higher than the average ratio for England and Wales. We pick this example
because it combines very large increases in numbers of vacancies as a result of Olympic-related
projects with a relatively depressed local labour market.
Speciﬁcally, we simulate the impact of a doubling in the number of vacancies in Stratford and
New Town Ward in a given month, from 464 to 928, under the assumption of constant returns
to scale, i.e. imposing  =0  an assumption that was not rejected in our estimates above. In
27the case of constant returns the total number of applications made by unemployed workers at all
locations is independent of the size of the economy, and thus it remains unaﬀected by the shock
considered (see equation (7)). Values used for  and  are those obtained in column 1 of Table 5.
With these estimates, the model predicts a total increase in the vacancy outﬂow, and thus in the
unemployment outﬂo w ,o f2 1 2 .
What is more interesting than the global eﬀect is its spatial distribution around the target ward.
The results of this exercise are reported in Table 9, showing the predicted percentage change in
applications per job (obtained from equation (10)), in the vacancy outﬂow (obtained from equation
(15)), and the unemployment outﬂow (obtained from equation (20)), within alternative distance
cutoﬀs from Stratford. As total applications in the economy stay constant, applications per job on
average fall. In Stratford, where vacancies double, applications per job fall by about 2.2%. Around
Stratford, applications per job also fall because Stratford attracts job applications from surrounding
areas. This spillover eﬀect decays with distance, and the percentage change in applications per job
is below 1% beyond 10 km from Stratford, and virtually zero beyond 35 km. The number of
vacancies ﬁlled in Stratford rises by 98.9%, with a very slight decline in the probability of ﬁlling
any one vacancy, given that the number of vacancies has doubled. There is a very tiny decrease
in the number of vacancies ﬁlled in surrounding areas as well, because of increased competition for
applicants in and around Stratford, but again this eﬀect is virtually negligible.
But when we look at the change in the unemployment outﬂow, we ﬁnd no evidence at all of any
sharp local eﬀect, with the unemployment outﬂow in Stratford only rising by 0.4%. If anything,
the unemployment outﬂo ww i t h i n2 0k mr i s e ss l i g h t l ym o r et h a ni nS t r a t f o r d , 15 and beyond this
cutoﬀ distance the change in the unemployment outﬂow becomes negligible. A similar picture can
be grasped graphically from the map in Figure 4, in which wards around Stratford are shaded
according to the average percentage change in the unemployment outﬂow.
T h eb o t t o ml i n ei st h a t ,w h i l el a b o urm a r k e t sa r eq uite ‘local’, in the sense that the attractive-
ness of job oﬀers strongly declines with distance, local labour markets do overlap; thus the ripple
eﬀect generated by local shocks implies that their propagation is fairly wide. One should there-
fore conclude that even strong local stimulus has a limited bite on the local outﬂow rate from
unemployment, because a series of spatial spillovers would greatly dilute any local shock across
space. Speciﬁcally, unemployed workers living relatively close to Stratford divert some of their job
search eﬀort from their local wards towards Stratford. This reduces job competition in their local
wards and attracts applications from elsewhere, and so on. This mechanism explains the spatial






term, capturing the extent of
job competition, falls more in Stratford than elsewhere. This term determines the number of applications sent from
each area  to each area , according to (8), and thus the unemployment outﬂow in each area , according to (20).
28propagation of local shocks in the presence of relatively high costs of distance.
How does this prediction about the impact of a local labour demand shock compare with what
has actually happened in Stratford in the run-up to the 2012 Olympic Games? Much of the increase
in labour demand is yet to take place (e.g. the jobs associated with running the Olympics itself),
while some has built up steadily over time (e.g. in construction). But there is one instance of a
sharp increase in labour demand that has taken place: on 13 September 2011, a new shopping centre,
Westﬁeld Stratford City, opened next to the London Olympic Park. This is one of the largest urban
shopping centres in Europe, and has been expected to contribute signiﬁcantly to local development,
“with the creation of up to 10,000 permanent jobs, including 2,000 jobs going to people in the local
area.”16 We can then look in the current unemployment and vacancy data (again extracted from
NOMIS) for any evidence of the corresponding labour demand shock on vacancy creation and the
unemployment outﬂow around Stratford.
Figure 5 presents a time series for new vacancies advertised in Stratford, in wards within 3km
of Stratford, and in all of London, all normalized to their January 2009 values.17 One can clearly
notice in Panel A the sharp rise in vacancies in Stratford in the summer of 2011 that is associated
with the opening of the shopping centre - vacancy inﬂows are running at over three times the usual
level. The other areas show no such trend. What about the unemployment outﬂow? - Panel B
shows this. Even though the vertical axis in Panel B is on a diﬀerent scale to that of Panel A,
o n ec a ns e el i t t l eo rn oe v i d e n c eo fa ni n c r e a s ei no u t ﬂows in Stratford or surrounding areas as a
result of the spike in vacancies. Not enough time has elapsed since the opening of the shopping
centre to do a proper statistical analysis of its eﬀects on the surrounding labour market, but the
early indications are exactly in line with the predictions of our model and are certainly consistent
with negligible local eﬀects of targeted labour demand stimulus, as shown in Table 9.
6.2 Reduction in Transportation Costs
We next assess the importance of transportation costs by simulating the impact of a sizeable
reduction in the cost of distance between Stratford and central London - and in order to focus
on distance costs alone we leave labour demand in Stratford unchanged. The idea is to evaluate
the impact of an improved transport link between a high-unemployment area and the city centre,
with relatively higher supply of jobs. Speciﬁcally, we simulate the eﬀect of a faster connection
between Stratford and Kings Cross Station in central London, by halving the distance between
the two corresponding wards. Stratford and Kings Cross are located 8.4 km apart, and we build
16http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Westﬁeld_Stratford_City
17While information on the stock of vacancies in the NOMIS is not comparable before and after May 2006 (see
footnote 3), the procedure for registering the inﬂow of newly advertised vacancies (reported in Figure 5) remains the
same.
29a new distance matrix in which the distance between the two wards is set at 4.2 km, and we
allow the distance between any two other wards  and  to be aﬀected if either the distance
−Kings Cross−Stratford− or −Kings Cross−Stratford− is shorter than the original distance
. Essentially this is equivalent to introducing a fast, non-stop service between Stratford and
Kings Cross, allowing individuals residing and searching near either location to re-optimize their
travel schedule accordingly. As a consequence, we would expect some jobseekers in Stratford (the
high-unemployment area) to choose to search for jobs in central London (the high-vacancy area),
thus raising the unemployment outﬂow in Stratford and at the same time raise applications per job
in central London, then lowering the unemployment outﬂow around Kings Cross.
We show in Table 10 the impact of this improved transport link on applications per job, the
vacancy outﬂow and the unemployment outﬂow, at various distances from King’s Cross and Strat-
ford. As expected, applications per job rise both in King’s Cross and its close vicinity (see column
1, rows 1 and 2), as central London is now attracting more jobseekers from Stratford and surround-
ing areas. As a consequence, the vacancy outﬂow increases (column 2) and the local jobseekers
are less likely to ﬁnd jobs (column 3) as they face stronger job competition from new applicants
attracted by the faster transport link. Moving down to row 3, we ﬁnd that applications per job
also rise in Stratford. Despite the fact that some jobseekers are quitting Stratford to search for jobs
in central London, the more eﬃcient transport link now attracts some jobseekers from other sur-
rounding areas. But the unemployment outﬂow still increases as the opportunity to ﬁnd jobs away
from Stratford dominates the eﬀect of increased job competition from elsewhere. Row 4 shows that
within 3 km from Stratford (and excluding Stratford itself), applications per job and the vacancy
outﬂow fall, and the unemployment outﬂow increases, all driven by the possibility of ﬁnding new
jobs elsewhere. It should be noted however that, quantitatively, the impact on the unemployment
outﬂow is always very small, whether positive or negative, and becomes negligible beyond 3 km
from either transport node (rows 5 and 6).
Spillovers on the unemployment outﬂow around King’s Cross and Stratford are illustrated in
more detail on a map in Figure 6, where darker and lighter shades correspond to an increase and
a decrease, respectively, in the unemployment outﬂow. The map once again shows that making
it easier for workers in a suburban, high-unemployment area to reach the urban centre raises the
unemployment outﬂow in the suburbs and depresses the unemployment outﬂow in the centre, with
declining intensity as one moves away from either transport node. Overall, as a consequence of
ripple eﬀects, the impact on the unemployment outﬂow is very modest (within a range -0.66% to
+0.55%), but it propagates quite widely around the target.
307C o n c l u s i o n s
In this paper we have used high-frequency, geographically very disaggregated data on unemployment
and vacancies to investigate the extent to which labour markets are ‘local’. These data allow us to
approximate the continuous nature of geographic space, and build overlapping local labour markets
based on optimizing job search behavior.
We have ﬁrst presented some non-structural estimates in which the probability of ﬁlling a
vacancy is inﬂuenced by unemployment and vacancies in the surrounding area, though more distant
unemployment and vacancies have a diminishing impact. However, we argued that such estimates
cannot adequately convey evidence on the true cost of distance.
We then proposed a model of job search across space that allows, in a tractable way, estimation
of a market process with a very large number of market segments. Our estimates of that model
suggest that the cost of distance is relatively high. That is, the utility of being oﬀered a job
decays at exponential rate around 0.3 with distance (in km) to the job, and similar qualitative
conclusions are obtained when we measure distance using commuting time or commuting costs.
Also, workers are signiﬁcantly discouraged from applying to jobs for which they expect a large
number of applications. Finally, constant returns in matching markets are not rejected, and in
particular the total number of job applications made in this economy does not respond to the
absolute size of the vacancy pool. Commuting ﬂows predicted by the estimated model replicate
fairly accurately actual commuting patterns across Census wards, although our model tends to
underpredict the proportion of individuals who live and work in the same ward.
We ﬁnally used the estimated model to simulate the impact of local development policies like
local stimulus to labour demand or improved transportation links. Despite the fact that labour
markets are relatively ‘local’, location-based policies turn out to be rather ineﬀective in raising the
local unemployment outﬂow, because labour markets overlaps and the associated ripple eﬀects in
applications largely dilute the eﬀect of local shocks across space. We argued that early indications
about the impact of the opening of a new shopping centre close to the site of the 2012 London
Olympics are consistent with this result.
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Figure 3  



































Recent changes in the vacancy inflow (Panel A) and the unemployment outflow (Panel B) 





Notes: All series are smoothed using moving averages with a 3-month window and equal monthly weights, and normalized 



















Vacancy inflow within 3 km (excluding Stratford)



























Unemployment outflow within 3 km (excluding Stratford)







































Notes. Source: NOMIS. Sample: CAS 2003 Wards in England and Wales, May 2004-April 2006. 
Variable  Mean  St. dev.  No. Obs. 
Unemployment stock  105.7  147.4  210755 
Unemployment inflow  20.4  24.6  210755 
Unemployment outflow  19.7  23.8  210755 
Vacancy stock  91.0  227.4  210755 
Vacancy inflow  28.1  72.1  210755 
Vacancy outflow  28.8  73.2  210755 41 
 
Table 2 
Log-linear matching functions 
 
 
Notes.  The Table provides estimates for equation (2) in the text. Sample: England and Wales, May 2004-April 2006. 
Standard errors are reported in brackets.  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 






 (0.00441)  (0.00478)  (0.00272)  (0.00266) (0.0190)  (0.0297) 







 (0.00528)  (0.00573)  (0.00336)  (0.00326) (0.00924)  (0.0175) 







 (0.0564)  (0.0560)  (0.0308) (0.0326) (0.0874)  (0.156) 




*** -0.0680 -0.0341 
 (0.0268)  (0.0268)  (0.0146) (0.0147) (0.0909)  (0.143) 
     /        -0.00135
* -0.00158
** 0.000589  0.000747 -0.000775 -0.000131 
 (0.000771)  (0.000756)  (0.000440)  (0.000460) (0.000885)  (0.00275) 




** 0.000197  -8.53e-05 
 (0.000108)  (0.000108)  (7.43e-05)  (8.05e-05)  (0.000136)  (0.000365) 







 (0.0444)  (0.0443)  (0.0222)  (0.0226) (0.0438) (0.0694) 




*** -0.0400 0.00774 
 (0.0241)  (0.0241)  (0.0133)  (0.0133) (0.0335) (0.0529) 




 (0.00105)  (0.000999)  (0.000470)  (0.000481) (0.000305)  (0.00146) 
     /        -2.42e-05 -4.40e-06 -6.00e-05 -8.20e-05 -9.47e-06 4.14e-05 
 (0.000121)  (0.000116)  (0.000109)  (0.000112) (7.71e-05) (0.000363) 
Observations  197579 197579 188648 188591 197579 188591 
Time  Effects  No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Ward  Effects  No No No No Yes  Yes 










Matching functions in log and level 
 
Notes.  Columns (1) and (4) provide estimates for equation (2) in the text. Estimation method is OLS. Columns (2), (3) and 
(5) provide estimates for the exponential of equation (2) in the text. Estimation method is nonlinear least squares. Sample: 
England and Wales, May 2004-April 2006 in columns (1)-(3) and February 2005 in column (5). Standard errors are 






Estimates of a job application model with an urn-ball matching function. 
Sample averages over May 2004-April 2006 
 
  Mean  St. Dev.  Min  Max  No. months 
    0.300 0.064 0.209 0.470  24 
    0.745 0.035 0.652 0.793  24 
    -0.068 0.075 -0.175 0.064  24 
Constant ( )  -0.766 0.192 -1.055 -0.419  24 
 
Notes. The Table reports mean estimates of the parameters  ,  ,   and   across the 24 months from May 2004-April 2006, 
together with standard deviations, minimum and maximum values. Monthly estimates are maximum likelihood estimates of 
equation (15), where the number of applications per job is given in equation (10). 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 






 (-0.00484)  (0.0079)  (0.0080)  (-0.0114)  (0.0115) 






 (-0.00535)  (0.0076)  (0.0078)  (-0.0129)  (0.0132) 






 (-0.0575)  (0.0934)  (0.0943)  (-0.1450)  (0.1405) 






 (-0.0269)  (0.0448)  (0.0456)  (-0.0648)  (0.0640) 






 (-0.0484)  (0.1043)  (0.1056)  (-0.1140)  (0.1155) 
    /        -0.0846
*** 0.018  0.0036  -0.0153  -0.062 
 (-0.0238)  (0.0387)  (0.0394)  (-0.0575)  (0.0574) 
Observations 197579  197579  208717  8282  8708 
Funct. Form  Log  Level  Level  Log  Level 










Estimates of a job application model: Alternative specifications for February 2005 
 
  Dependent variable: Vacancy outflow rate 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 








  (0.058) (0.070) (0.069) (0.059) (0.029) (0.117) (0.038)   







***   
  (0.064) (0.076) (0.087) (0.050) (0.039) (0.042) (0.044)   
    -0.043 -0.067 -0.009 -0.038 -0.060 -0.053 -0.048   
  (0.087) (0.121) (0.131) (0.086) (0.086) (0.084) (0.057)   
           0.783
***   
         (0.182)   









  (0.141) (0.167) (0.151) (0.110) (0.123) (0.123) (0.083) (0.026) 
   /     0.044
*** 0.026         0.087
*** 
    (0.008)  (0.025)       (0.013) 
         -0.020         
      (0.025)        
Observations 8709  8709 8709 8709 8709 8709 8709 8709 
Adjusted    R2  0.0395 0.0302 0.0305 0.0391 0.0377 0.0374 0.0410 0.0109 
Distance concept  Geographic  Geographic  Geographic Geographic  Time  Cost  Geographic  - 
MF specification  Urn-ball  Urn-ball  Urn-ball  Log-linear  Urn-ball Urn-ball Urn-ball Urn-ball 
 
Notes. The table reports maximum likelihood estimates of the matching function (see equation (15) for the main specification), where the number of applications per job is given in 




Estimates of a job application model: Controlling for commuting flows 
 
Dependent variable: vacancy outflow rate 
  (1) (2) (3) 




  (0.070) (0.034) (0.133) 




  (0.045) (0.033) (0.035) 
    -0.036 -0.069 -0.063 





  (2.536) (1.648) (1.738) 




  (0.061) (0.086) (0.080) 
Observations 8709  8709 8709 
Adjusted  R2  0.0413  0.0383  0.0386 
Distance concept  Geographic  Time  Cost 
MF  specification  Urn-ball Urn-ball Urn-ball 
 
Notes. The table reports maximum likelihood estimates of the matching function (see equation (15)), where the number 
of applications per job is given in equation (10).  The extra regressor included in the cost of distance measures the 
number of individuals resident in the origin ward  , who commute to the destination ward  . Standard error corrected 

























Notes. Figures report one-way daily commuting times (in minutes). New jobs are defined by tenure up to three months. 






The distribution of actual and predicted commuting flows 
 
  Percentage of commuters 
Distance Actual  Predicted 
0 km  23.7  10.1 
(0,5] km  29.5  44.4 
(5,10] km  18.4  25.5 
(10,20] km  15.5  13.3 
20+ km  12.9  6.7 
Total 100  100 
 
Notes. Actual commuting flows are obtained from the Census 2001, and predicted commuting flows are obtained from 
equation (21), evaluated at parameter values reported in column (1) of Table (5). 
  
    Mean  Std. Dev.  No. Obs. 
Not on new job  24.5  22.2  612787 
On new job, found via:       
  Reply to advert  24.5  21.6  16059 
 Job  centre  24.5  20.2  4491 
 Careers  office  30.2  26.1  453 
 Jobclub  25.6  25.6  61 
 Private  agency  34.6  26.4  4859 
 Personal  contact  23.2  23.0  15523 
 Direct  application  22.4  21.7  9646 
  Some other method  27.7  26.7  5618 
Total 24.5  22.3  669497 46 
 
 
Table 9  
The propagation of local shocks 
 
 Percentage  change 






0 km  -2.16  98.90  0.40 
(0,5] km  -1.88  -0.48  0.66 
(5,10] km  -1.33  -0.34  0.66 
(10,20] km  -0.76  -0.19  0.45 
(20,35] km  -0.27  -0.07  0.18 
(35,50] km  -0.04  -0.01  0.04 
50+ km  -0.00  -0.00  0.00 
 
Notes: The Table shows the simulated effect of a doubling in the number of vacancies in Stratford and New Town 






The effect of reducing the cost of distance  
 
 Percentage  change 






King’s Cross  4.38  1.09  -0.43 
(0,3] km from King’s Cross  1.39  0.36  -0.43 
Stratford 1.73  0.43  0.41 
(0,3] km from Stratford  -0.59  -0.15  0.20 
(3,10] from both  0.13  0.03  -0.09 
10+ km from both  -0.02  -0.00  0.00 
 
Notes: The Table shows the simulated effect of halving the cost of distance between King’s Cross Ward and Stratford 





Estimates of a job application model: Average values for May 2004-April 2006 
 
  Dependent variable: Vacancy outflow rate 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
    0.300 0.259 0.269 0.314 0.246 0.917 0.316   
  (0.064) (0.036) (0.044) (0.091) (0.097) (0.323) (0.074)   
    0.749 0.793 0.774 0.798 0.765 0.762 0.766   
  (0.035) (0.033) (0.036) (0.031) (0.029) (0.030) (0.015)   
    -0.068 -0.101 -0.063 -0.060 -0.103 -0.097 -0.039   
  (0.075) (0.083) (0.110) (0.081) (0.075) (0.074) (0.074)   
           0 . 2 0 0    
         ( 0 . 3 9 6 )    
Constant ( )  -0.766 -0.760 -0.756 -1.003 -0.737 -0.740 -0.813 -0.962 
  (0.192) (0.189) (0.191) (0.154) (0.174) (0.177) (0.188) (0.122) 
   /      0.046 0.032       0.091 
   (0.016)  (0.018)        (0.017) 
         -0.015        
      (0.020)        
Observations  24 24 24 24 24 24 16 24 
Distance concept  Geographic  Geographic  Geographic Geographic  Time  Cost  Geographic  - 
MF specification  Urn-ball  Urn-ball  Urn-ball  Log-linear  Urn-ball Urn-ball Urn-ball Urn-ball 
 
Notes. Model specifications are the same as in Table 5. Coefficients reported are averages across monthly estimates, with standard deviations reported in brackets. Specification (7) 





Estimates of a job application model, controlling for commuting flows: Average values for May 2004-
April 2006 
 
Dependent variable: vacancy outflow rate 
  (1) (2) (3) 
    0.379 0.252 0.951 
  (0.082) (0.069) (0.262) 
    0.748 0.767 0.764 
  (0.036) (0.030) (0.031) 
    -0.072 -0.106 -0.099 
  (0.056) (0.076) (0.074) 
Commuters  -10.786 -1.724  -2.458 
  (7.251) (6.114) (6.755) 
Constant ( )  -0.779 -0.739 -0.744 
  (0.154) (0.170) (0.170) 
Observations  24 24 24 
Distance concept  Geographic  Time  Cost 
MF  specification  Urn-ball Urn-ball Urn-ball 
 
Notes. Model specifications are the same as in Table 6. Coefficients reported are averages across monthly estimates, 
with standard deviations reported in brackets. CENTRE FOR ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 
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